Presidential Decisions to Intern and Detain Uncharged Persons: A Comparison of the Franklin D. Roosevelt and the George W. Bush Administrations by Woodruff, Christopher
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS TO INTERN AND DETAIN 
UNCHARGED PERSONS: A COMPARISON OF THE FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT AND THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS   
A Senior Honors Thesis 
by 
CHRISTOPHER A. WOODRUFF 
Submitted to the Office of Honors Programs 
& Academic Scholarships 
Texas A&M University 
In partial fulfillment of the requirements of the 
UNIVERSITY UNDERGRADUATE 
RESEARCH FELLOWS 
April 2006 
Majors: International Studies and Spanish 
  
PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS TO INTERN AND DETAIN 
UNCHARGED PERSONS: A COMPARISON OF THE FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT AND THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS   
 
 
A Senior Honors Thesis 
by 
CHRISTOPHER A. WOODRUFF 
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Honors Programs 
& Academic Scholarships 
Texas A&M University 
In partial fulfillment for the designation of 
 
 
UNIVERSITY UNDERGRADUATE  
RESEARCH FELLOWS 
Approved as to style and content by: 
 
 
---------------------------------------------    ------------------------------------------ 
 Terry H. Anderson     Edward A. Funkhouser 
 (Fellows Advisor)                (Executive Director) 
 
April 2006 
 
Majors: International Studies and Spanish 
  
iii 
ABSTRACT 
 
Presidential Decisions to Intern and Detain Uncharged Persons: A 
Comparison of the Franklin D. Roosevelt and the George W. Bush 
Administrations (April 2006) 
 
Christopher A. Woodruff 
Departments of International Studies and Spanish 
Texas A&M University 
 
Fellows Advisor: Dr. Terry H. Anderson 
Department of History 
 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the internment and detainment policies 
used by Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and George W. Bush as methods for protecting 
the United States from attack during World War II and the War on Terror.  This study 
comes from a desire to better understand Bush’s decision to use indefinite detainment as 
a tool in the War on Terror, and in looking for an historical precedent, Roosevelt’s 
internment of Japanese Americans appeared to possess many similar characteristics.  
Therefore, through direct comparison and analysis of historical and legal sources, this 
  
iv 
research highlights major similarities and differences that existed between the two 
episodes.     
Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066 affected the lives of over 120,000 people and 
over 70,000 U.S. citizens.  Decades of anti-Asian sentiment, the public hysteria that 
erupted following Pearl Harbor, and the racially-biased suspicions of disloyalty, all 
played a role in Roosevelt’s ultimate decision to give the Secretary of War the authority 
to evacuate and incarcerate the ethnic Japanese population on the West Coast.  Similarly, 
Bush responded to the September 11 attacks by advocating the need for indefinite 
detainment of hundreds of terrorism suspects, both U.S. citizen and non citizen.  He also 
issued the Military Order of November 13, 2001, which gave substantial power to the 
Secretary of Defense to detain, charge, and try suspects, but did not require that they be 
charged.       
Through analysis of initial FBI arrests, public opinion trends, prisoner treatment, 
and Supreme Court cases, this research allows its readers to consider the thesis that 
Roosevelt’s and Bush’s actions represent a pattern of presidential decisions that might 
conflict with human and constitutional rights.
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1 
INTRODUCTION
1
  
Throughout the course of U.S. history, few episodes have tested the resolve of a 
nation as severely as World War II and the War on Terror.  In each, the U.S. was caught 
by surprise and ushered, unprepared, into indefinite conflict with ruthless enemies.  
These tests, however, have not been limited to the capabilities of U.S. armed forces 
meeting others on the battlefield, but instead have challenged the ideas and principles 
upon which this nation was founded.  Belief in life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, 
has been an American creed since 1776, yet even great leaders have been forced to 
sacrifice these values in the face of extreme circumstances.  Presidents Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and George W. Bush were both charged with responding to unprecedented 
crises, and although each faced unique challenges from different situations, this thesis 
will attempt to draw comparisons between the policies enacted by each in order to secure 
the country.  Of particular interest are the detainment programs set up by both Roosevelt 
and Bush after the attack on Pearl Harbor and September 11.  While most historians 
have deemed FDR’s internment of Japanese Americans as an injustice, judgment awaits 
Bush’s detainment of terrorism suspects in locations such as Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 
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2 
CRISIS 
On the morning of December 7, 1941, warplanes took off from the Imperial 
Japanese carrier fleet in the Pacific Ocean and attacked the U.S. naval base at Pearl 
Harbor, Hawaii.  This sneak attack caught the U.S. Pacific fleet unprepared, killing 
2,388 people, and inflicting a debilitating blow against US naval power in the Pacific.  
The effects of this crisis were immediately felt on the mainland as well, as historian 
Roger Daniels noted, “despite decades of propaganda and apprehension about a Pacific 
war, the reality, the dawn attack at Pearl Harbor . . . came as a stunning surprise to most 
Americans.”  To a public struggling to come out of an economic depression, this shock 
might have been devastating, but instead America overcame its initial shock and 
“entered the war with perhaps more unity than has existed before or since.”
2
   
  
Almost sixty years later, on September 11, 2001, al Qaeda terrorists hijacked four 
commercial airliners on the East Coast, crashing two of them into the World Trade 
Center in New York City, one into the Pentagon building in Arlington, Virginia, and the 
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3 
final plane crashed into a field in Pennsylvania.  In all, there were 3,047 victims, and yet 
again the American people had cause to unite in unprecedented form.  The 9/11 attacks 
caught the nation completely off guard, and although the 9/11 Commission has since 
reported that U.S. intelligence agencies failed to recognize warning signs of the 
impending attack, few people worldwide had ever dreamed of such a successful terrorist 
attack. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
4 
INITIAL RESPONSE 
 As an immediate response to the Pearl Harbor attack, and to the U.S. entrance 
into World War II, the Justice Department began rounding up all suspicious “enemy 
aliens.”  On December 7
 
and 8, 1941, President Roosevelt issued proclamations nos. 
2525, 2526, and 2527, which subjected all Japanese, German, and Italian aliens in the 
U.S. to arrest and detention.
3
  These proclamations were quickly executed by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, which apprehended 1,717 aliens within twenty-four hours of the 
attack (1,212 of those were of Japanese ancestry).  The need for these operations had 
been foreseen when on September 6, 1939, Roosevelt “designated the FBI as the primary 
agency to investigate matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violation of neutrality 
regulations.”
4
  Thus began the FBI’s investigations into the lives of aliens, ultimately 
facilitating their timely arrests in the wake of December 7.   
Additionally, Congress had passed the Smith Act in June of 1940 and it required 
every alien over fourteen years old to register and be fingerprinted, so by December of 
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that same year the Justice Department had registered over five million aliens.  However, 
despite extensive pre-war intelligence planning, “as early as 8 December 1941,” General 
Counsel of the Immigration and Naturalization Service Edward J. Ennis noted, “the FBI 
was turning many aliens over to the INS without a written statement showing good cause 
for detention.”
5
  Others also expressed concerns about the “haphazardness of the 
indiscriminate pickups,” and in fact, Assistant Attorney General James Rowe Jr. 
admitted that “we picked up too many . . . some of this stuff they were charged on was 
as silly as hell.”
6
  Nevertheless, feeling as though the safety of the nation depended on 
them, the FBI continued to pursue potential saboteurs and used an “ABC” system to 
classify its suspects.  “A” suspects “were aliens who led cultural organizations,” “B” 
“were slightly less suspicious aliens,” and “C” “consisted of Japanese language teachers 
and Buddhist priests.”
7
  In general, community and religious leaders, language 
instructors, and donors to pro-Japanese organizations were the targets of the initial 
arrests.  In all, over 5,000 first generation “Issei” and second generation “Nisei” were 
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interrogated by the FBI despite intelligence reports stating that only a tiny portion of the 
Japanese American population was considered a threat.
8
  In fact, Curtis B. Munson’s 
secret report on the West Coast Japanese population, made during November 1941 in 
consultation with both the FBI and Naval Intelligence, stated that the “Intelligence 
Services . . . believe that only 50 to 60” Japanese in each Naval District can be classified 
as “really dangerous.”
9
  Therefore, given the existence of only three Naval Districts on 
the West Coast (11
th
, 12
th
, & 13
th
), the fact that over 5,000 Issei and Nisei were 
interrogated is evidence that officers were caught up in the anti-Japanese hysteria known 
as the “yellow peril,” which quickly swept over California, Oregon, and Washington, 
pushing aside good sense and reason. 
 Alternatively, Attorney General Francis Biddle attempted to dispel any notion 
that arrests had been made on the basis of nationality alone, as he announced that there 
would be a system in place to consider each individual case on its own merits.
10
  
Established by the Justice Department, the program alluded to by Biddle was called the 
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Alien Enemy Control Unit (AECU).  It was operated from Washington D.C., but every 
federal district throughout the country had its own Alien Enemy Hearing Board.  
According to historian John Joel Culley, 
An FBI field office initiated the process by submitting its dossier on an 
individual alien to a US Attorney who considered the evidence and 
forwarded a request to the AECU for a presidential warrant of 
apprehension.  After review, the AECU could issue a warrant which the 
FBI executed, and the case moved to the local Alien Enemy Hearing 
Board where the second phase of the program began.
11
 
From there, the aliens would appear before a board of local civilian community 
members, representatives of the US Attorney’s office, and representatives of the FBI.  
Head of the AECU, Edward J. Ennis was bold enough to assert that “every doubt . . . 
must be resolved against him [the alien] and in favour of the Government.”
12
  Therefore, 
what might have seemed like an objective evaluation of facts actually was tainted by 
biased attitudes and the need for expediency, as the aliens were not even allowed to 
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confront the government’s evidence against them.  What’s more, the system was quickly 
overwhelmed by the sheer number of suspects, and as the Army continued its urging for 
the Justice Department to comply with its push towards complete removal of all 
Japanese aliens from strategic West Coast areas, many suspects were taken into INS 
custody never to receive a hearing.
13
   
             
After the 9/11 attacks, the Justice Department responded in a similar way as it 
had following Pearl Harbor.  The FBI took the lead in investigating the attacks 
themselves and in searching for accomplices or other terrorists preparing additional 
strikes.  According to the Department of Justice’s April 2003 report entitled The 
September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration 
Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks, more than 
1,200 citizens and aliens were detained at least for questioning within two months of the 
attacks.
14
  Attorney General John Ashcroft articulated his view of the mission facing the 
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Department of Justice in a September 17, 2001 memo, where he stated that the 
Department would prevent future terrorism by detaining violators who “have been 
identified as persons who participate in, or lend support to, terrorist activities.  Federal 
law enforcement agencies and the United States Attorneys’ Offices will use every 
available law enforcement tool to incapacitate these individuals and their organizations.”  
The investigation that ensued was known as the Pentagon/Twin Towers Bombings 
investigation, or PENTTBOM, and it would eventually incorporate elements of federal, 
state, and local law enforcement agencies in order handle the more than 96,000 leads 
that poured into FBI headquarters after the attacks.
15
  
 Through cooperation from the airlines, the names and nationalities of the 
hijackers were passed on to the FBI, and much like in 1941, because the attackers were 
aliens, the INS came to play a major role in the detention of potential suspects.  In all, 
762 aliens were arrested by the FBI as either persons “of interest” or “persons of high 
interest,” and delivered to INS custody on charges of immigration violations.  However, 
Inspector General Glenn A. Fine admitted in his report that the procedures used to make 
arrests when pursuing leads during PENTTBOM investigations were at times arbitrary, 
                                                 
15
 United States, The September 11 Detainees 12. 
  
10 
as “the FBI interpreted and applied the term ‘of interest to the September 11 
investigation’ quite broadly.”  In fact, the report explained that “no distinction generally 
was made between the subjects of the lead and many other individuals encountered at 
the scene ‘incidentally,’ because the FBI wanted to be certain that no terrorist was 
inadvertently set free.”   
The FBI’s caution can be appreciated, but at what cost?  The large number of 
detainees soon slowed the complex multi-agency processing system, leading to delays in 
due process.  Further reflecting the Department’s caution, the FBI insisted that all 
arrested suspects be initially denied bond.  This meant that the detainees had no ability to 
request a bond re-determination hearing until after being served their INS “Notice to 
Appear” document that outlined the charges against them, and this document could only 
be issued upon criminal clearance of each suspect by the FBI.  The Inspector General 
admitted that despite efforts to complete the detainee clearance process in a timely 
manner, “the FBI took, on average, 80 days to clear a Sept. 11 detainee,” and as he later 
concludes, “these delays affected the detainees’ ability to obtain legal counsel and 
postponed the detainees’ opportunity to seek a bond re-determination hearing.”  
Additionally, the most alarming criticism of the Department’s handling of detainees was 
  
11 
the evidence suggesting “a pattern of physical and verbal abuse by some correctional 
officers,” and the conclusion reached by Inspector General Fine that “certain conditions 
of confinement were unduly harsh, such as illuminating the detainees’ cells for twenty-
four hours a day.”
16
  Ultimately, the majority of those arrested were found to be in 
violation of immigration law, and either removed from the United States, allowed to 
depart voluntarily, or released from INS custody.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 United States, The September 11 Detainees 5, 16, 26, 188-89, 197. 
  
12 
SUPPORT FOR INTERNMENT/DETAINMENT 
Late 1941 and early 1942 were chaotic and stressful times for Americans, but 
those on the West Coast particularly had to live with the fear of a foreign invasion.  
Eventually, this turmoil led U.S. leaders to make a series of decisions that ultimately led 
to President Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066.   
Many influential events, however, preceded this order.  First, public opinion had 
an enormous impact on eventual decisions toward internment, and much of the public’s 
fears were spawned through the releases of two governmental reports.  The Roberts 
Report, headed by Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, was the result of the official 
government committee of inquiry into the attacks, and the Knox Report, led by Navy 
Secretary Frank Knox, was the work of the Navy’s own fact-finding commission.  Both 
emphasized that the attack on Pearl Harbor had been aided by successful Japanese 
American treachery on the Hawaiian Islands.  Thus, their statures allowed them to 
command public attention and opinion, and inspired newspapermen like William 
Randolph Hearst to sensationalize public fears into the hysteria known as the “yellow 
peril.”  It is interesting to note that the Roberts Report even went so far as to blame the 
Constitution, implying that it had “seriously inhibited” the work of the FBI in its 
  
13 
counterespionage activities.
17
  Like falling dominoes, prominent leaders continued to 
build the paranoia, all the way to the point when Earl Warren, California’s Attorney 
General, issued his popular conspiracy theory: “I believe that we are just being lulled 
into a false sense of security and that the only reason we haven’t had a disaster in 
California is because it has been timed for a different date.  Our day of reckoning is 
bound to come in that regard.”
18
  Additionally, Warren, who later became Chief Justice 
of the U.S. Supreme Court, played up suspicions that Japanese Americans were well 
organized and had intentionally “infiltrated themselves into every strategic spot” in 
California’s coastal and valley counties.
19
  Public outcry soon called for steps to be taken 
in order to secure the homeland from the perceived threat, and on February 4, 1942, the 
Office of Facts and Figures released the results of the previous week’s public opinion 
poll, in which “between 23 and 43 percent” of respondents believed that “further action 
was necessary” on the part of the government for dealing with the Japanese Americans.
20
  
One example of the public’s stance can be seen in the testimony of the all-white Western 
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Growers Protective Association, who, feeling that their long association with Japanese in 
agriculture made them especially knowledgeable, declared that “no individual Japanese, 
or . . . American citizen of Japanese parentage, can be judged as to his loyalty solely by 
past experience.”
21
  These views were dutifully represented by elected representatives in 
Washington, D.C., where they were passed on to the War Department.  On January 16, 
1942, California Congressman Leland Ford urged War Secretary Stimson to have “all 
Japanese, whether citizen or not . . . placed in inland concentration camps.”  Ford 
continued by suggesting that in order to test loyalty, “any Japanese willing to go to a 
concentration camp was a patriot; therefore it followed that unwillingness to go was 
proof of disloyalty to the United States.”
22
  This kind of reverse-psychological approach 
mirrored Warren’s conspiracy theory, and as backward as it may seem now, it made 
perfect sense then.   
 Second, there were those who pleaded with the public for tolerance, to consider 
each person’s loyalty individually, and to give the Japanese at the very least the same 
benefit of the doubt given to German and Italian aliens.
23
  The most important 
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organization representing their interests was the Japanese American Citizens League 
(JACL), and just as the name implies, only U.S. citizens were allowed membership.  In 
anticipation of the government and public backlash, the JACL wired a message to 
Roosevelt immediately after Pearl Harbor affirming their loyalty.  The Nisei also 
established direct communication with the FBI in Los Angeles, and called on younger 
Japanese generations to report any suspicious behavior by their elders.
24
  The JACL 
leadership realized the likelihood that the government would act against their 
constituents, but they had little choice other than to hold onto the hopes expressed by 
Mike Masoka when he wrote the JACL creed in 1940; part of which is quoted here:  
I am firm in my belief that American sportsmanship and attitude of fair 
play will judge citizenship and patriotism on the basis of action and 
achievement, and not on the basis of physical characteristics.  Because I 
believe in America, and I trust she believes in me, and because I have 
received innumerable benefits from her, I pledge myself to do honor to 
her at all times and all places; to support her constitution; to obey her 
laws; to respect her flag; to defend her against all enemies, foreign and 
domestic; to actively assume my duties and obligations as a citizen, 
cheerfully and without any reservations whatsoever, in the hope that I 
may become a better American in a greater America.
25
   
 
                                                 
24
 Daniels, Concentration Camps 41. 
25
 Daniels, Concentration Camps 25. 
  
16 
Nevertheless, historian Roger Daniels opined that the counsel for the Southern 
California Branch of the American Civil Liberties Union, A.L. Wirin, voiced the 
strongest opinion in favor of respecting the Japanese Americans’ rights by insisting that 
even in wartime, “there must be a point beyond which there may be no abridgement of 
civil liberties and we feel that whatever emergency, that persons must be judged, so long 
as we have a Bill of Rights, because of what they do as persons.”
26
  Unfortunately, even 
these eloquent declarations did little to stem the racial hatred that ignited after Pearl 
Harbor.     
Despite these public pleas, the best case made on behalf of America’s Japanese 
population was in a secret report by a special agent of the State Department, Curtis B. 
Munson, completed in October and November of 1941.  He was charged with collecting 
intelligence for a loyalty assessment on the Japanese living on the West Coast, to be 
submitted to President Roosevelt.  During his investigation, Munson spent a week in 
each of the three Naval Districts, and he noted that he received the “full cooperation of 
the Naval and Army Intelligence and the FBI.”
27
  In fact, Munson bragged on the Navy 
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for its extensive ten to fifteen years of research into the possibility of a Japanese 
uprising, and it is interesting that given full access to such a wealth of information and 
intelligence, Munson reported that everything presented to him was “on the whole, fairly 
clear and opinion toward the problem exceedingly uniform.”
28
  Therefore, his conclusion 
that “there will be no armed uprising of Japanese” was based on unvarying opinions held 
by U.S. intelligence services and consistent information encountered throughout his 
investigation.
29
  Nevertheless, it is clear that the Army and the President likely paid most 
of their attention to Munson’s brief assessments of threats posed by a miniscule minority 
of the Japanese population, rather than to the big picture offered: 
There are still Japanese in the United States who will tie dynamite around 
their waist and make a human bomb out of themselves.  We grant this, 
but today they are few. . . . There will be the odd case of fanatical 
sabotage by some Japanese ‘crackpot.’ . . . We are wide open to sabotage 
on this Coast and as far inland as the mountains, and while this one fact 
goes unrectified I cannot unqualifiedly state that there is no danger from 
the Japanese living in the United States which otherwise I would be 
willing to state.
30
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Even with these admissions, Munson’s thesis clearly proposed that despite the probable 
sabotage attempts by Imperial Japanese agents and the unpredictability of a few ultra-
radical Japanese living in the U.S., the population as a whole would be loyal and in no 
way posed a greater threat than any other racial group with which the U.S. might go to 
war.   
 It is important to note that Munson’s report was classified, unavailable for public 
consideration, and thus allowed other official government publications like the Roberts 
Report to exist unrivaled in the public arena.  Nevertheless, the events of December 7 
clearly altered the viewpoint from which Roosevelt and his advisers analyzed the 
implications and applicability of Munson’s work, so in order to reemphasize his 
assertions he traveled to Hawaii after the attacks to expand his study.  The supplemental 
investigation produced two more reports entitled “Report and Suggestions Regarding 
Handling Japanese Question on the Coast” and “Report on Hawaiian Islands” that were 
completed on December 20.  The immediate concern was a statement made by Secretary 
Knox following Pearl Harbor that received enormous publicity.  Knox was quoted as 
saying, “I think the most effective Fifth Column work of the entire war was done in 
Hawaii with the possible exception of Norway,” to which Munson responded that the 
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Secretary’s words created the “wrong impression.”  Contrary to Knox, Munson doubted 
that “outside of sabotage, organized and paid for by the Imperial Japanese Government 
beforehand, that there was any large disloyal element of the Japanese population which 
went into action as a Fifth Column.”  As with the West Coast investigation, Munson 
again received the full cooperation of every U.S. intelligence agency, and this time he 
was also aided by British Intelligence.  Through these connections, he reached many 
similar conclusions as he had in his first report, including that the islands’ second-
generation Nisei citizens were approximated at 98 percent loyal, and out of the entire 
alien population only fifty or sixty persons were deemed “sinister” by a private FBI 
estimate.  In fact, Munson turned the tables by declaring that “the real danger of racial 
trouble comes from the defense workers who have been imported from the mainland,” 
because, he explained, “to them every Japanese is a ‘Yellow Peril’ and to be treated 
accordingly.”  Therefore, after interviews, observation, and unrestricted access to 
intelligence information, the President’s reporter bravely stood by his November 
conclusions that there would be no racial uprising either in Hawaii or on the West Coast 
by Japanese Americans.   
  
20 
His confidence on this issue led Munson to also propose a number of suggestions 
for how the government might best lead the nation away from mass racism.  The number 
one suggestion was that someone from “high government authority” (the President or 
Vice President) should encourage the loyal Japanese through a statement of praise that 
would also outline public attitude toward them.
31
  Roger Daniels agreed with Munson’s 
idea in his essay “Incarcerating Japanese-Americans: An Atrocity Revisited,” by saying, 
“only the President himself might have been heard above the patriotic racist roar, but he 
was silent.”  In fact, claimed Daniels, “Franklin Roosevelt was not prepared either to risk 
rupturing war-time unity by taking an unpopular stand,” or “to oppose the political 
pressures for incarceration” that began to build from within his own government in 
December and early January.
32
  As was evidenced by Roosevelt’s actions or lack there 
of, many if not all of Munson’s findings were ignored, and the sexier political decision 
to indulge calls for “revenge” against Japanese Americans was made.
33
  Also intriguing 
was that, “with amazing aplomb, the Army, whose own intelligence service had been an 
integral part of the investigative teamwork, was to maintain baldly throughout that the 
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loyalties of this group were ‘unknown.’”
34
  The Army’s ability to take this stance was 
obviously permitted by the fact that the Munson Report was kept a secret, and to Weglyn 
this was a prime example of “how executive officers of the Republic are able to mislead 
public opinion by keeping hidden facts which are precisely the opposite of what the 
public is told—information vital to the opinions they hold.”
35
 
 
Much like the reaction to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, the immediate and 
overwhelming public suspicion after the 9/11 attacks fell on people of the same or 
similar ethnic and religious backgrounds as the hijackers.  Anonymous tips were 
commonly called in to the FBI by people simply suspicious of their Arab or Muslim 
neighbors.  Anti-Arab behavior was nothing new in the U.S.; it had been well 
documented since the 1970s.  Rooted in well-known events like the Iran hostage crisis in 
1979, the hijacking of the Italian cruise liner the Achile Lauro by the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization in 1985, and the Persian Gulf War in 1991, Americans held the 
stereotype of the Muslim “terrorist” long before September 11.  According to the Human 
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Rights Watch study entitled “We are not the Enemy,” the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and oil 
embargo was a major starting point for “increased prejudice and discrimination” against 
Arab communities.
36
  From that point forward, the association of terrorism with Arabs 
led to a predictable trend in the U.S. that usually included violent backlashes, known as 
“hate crimes,” directed at Arabs, Muslims, and all those perceived to be Arab or Muslim; 
usually including Sikhs and South Asians.  Therefore, to experts the wave of violence 
that spread after 9/11 was no surprise, but it nonetheless was “unique” in its “severity 
and extent.”
37
   
These hate crimes ranged from physical attacks and murders, to religious 
violence and vandalism, and to general discrimination and distrust.  For example, both 
Los Angeles County and Chicago officials “reported fifteen times the number of anti-
Arab and anti-Muslim crimes in 2001 compared to the preceding year.”  This statistic is 
incredible because though it accounts for the entire year, the bulk of these crimes were 
all committed within the three months immediately after 9/11.  Also, these crimes were 
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not distinct to any one section of the country, but were an epidemic that encompassed 
every state.  On the night of September 12 assailants fired on the Islamic Center of 
Irving, Texas, on November 16 someone threw rocks through two windows of the 
United Muslim Masjid in Waterbury, Connecticut, and on December 29 vandals severely 
damaged the interior of the Islamic Foundation of Central Ohio, in Columbus.  All in all, 
the FBI reported a “seventeen fold increase in anti-Muslim crimes nationwide during 
2001,” and the Human Rights Watch group reported a “700 percent” increase in anti-
Muslim activities after the attacks.
38
                       
In order to ease tensions and reassure both American Muslims and non-Muslims, 
President Bush sponsored an elaborate campaign demonstrating American goodwill and 
respect for Islam.  Bush not only visited with prominent Muslim leaders, but on 
November 19, 2001, he hosted the “first ever Iftar—or breaking-of-the-fast—dinner at 
the White House,” which concluded the annual Islamic celebration of Ramadan.
39
  Also 
unprecedented were the efforts made by state and local leaders and law enforcement to 
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discourage those who wished to participate in or incite hate-fueled violence.  The city of 
Seattle, for example, passed a resolution that decried hate crimes.
40
  In addition, the 
mayor created an Arab advisory council, and the police department gave hate crime 
presentations to the people of eleven area mosques, as well as providing them with 
contact numbers to be used when reporting hate crimes.
41
  Taking a similar approach, 
San Francisco’s district attorney’s office launched a tolerance and anti-hate crime 
campaign two weeks prior to the first anniversary of 9/11.  The slogan for the campaign, 
which featured posters clad with persons likely to be perceived as Arab or Muslim, was 
“We Are Not The Enemy.”
42
  (The significance of these actions by the cities of Seattle 
and San Francisco is much greater if one considers that during WWII both cities were 
epicenters for the hate against Japanese Americans.  The Army’s Western Defense 
Commander, Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt was stationed in the San Francisco 
area, at the Presidio, and Bainbridge Island, Washington, located near Seattle, was the 
object of Exclusion Order No. 1, issued on March 24, 1942.)  Nevertheless, the best 
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example of successful efforts to combat backlash attacks was in Dearborn, Michigan, 
where only two accounts of 9/11-related violence were reported in a city with over 
30,000 Arab-Americans.
43
  Largely attributed to the strong working relationship 
established between Arab community leaders and the Dearborn police before 9/11, this 
served as a great testament to the benefits of pre-attack preparations and readiness.   
Most important, however, were the federal government’s and the President’s 
uncompromising condemnations of reprisal crimes perpetrated by Americans against 
perceived Arabs and Muslims.  On September 15, 2001, the U.S. House of 
Representatives passed a resolution condemning hate crimes committed against Arabs, 
Muslims, and South Asians.  The U.S. Senate responded in kind with its own resolution 
calling for the end of hate crimes carried out against Sikhs.  Still, as if taking a page out 
of the Munson Report’s list of suggestions for how to best deal with anti-Japanese 
sentiment, on September 17, President Bush made this public announcement: “Those 
who feel like they can intimidate our fellow citizens to take out their anger don’t 
represent the best of America, they represent the worst of humankind, and they should 
be ashamed of that kind of behavior.”  Further reinforcing Munson’s theory, Raed 
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Tayeh, Director of American Muslims for Global Peace and Justice, and Deepa Iyer, of 
South Asian American Leaders of Tomorrow, both opined that “public statements 
embracing the millions of law-abiding Arabs and Muslims as part of American society 
and communicating that hate crimes would not be tolerated were among the most 
effective measures that countered and contained September 11-related violence.”
44
          
Unfortunately, however, veiled by these high-profile acts of solidarity and 
understanding, there still were elements of resentment and distrust within the American 
public.  For example, Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham, as part of his recognition 
of Americans for acts of goodwill after 9/11, honored a church for starting a program to 
escort Muslim women who wear the hijab, and he also praised “a citizen who created a 
fund to assist low-income Muslim victims of hate-inspired vandalism.”
45
  Surely, these 
types of programs would not have been necessary in an America free of hate and 
ignorance, but in reality those two conditions did exist.  In fact, a 2004 survey conducted 
through Cornell University, illustrated that the fear of impending terrorist attacks and 
ignorance of the Muslim culture, went along with supporting restrictions on the civil 
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liberties of Muslim Americans.
46
  Specifically, the percent of respondents who feared a 
terrorist attack would happen within the following year fell from 90 percent in 
November 2002 to 37 percent in November 2004, but as of the latter year, “44 percent of 
all respondents agreed that at least one form of restriction should be placed on Muslim 
American civil liberties.”  This statistic was coupled with the fact that only 54 percent of 
Americans surveyed knew both that Muslims refer to God as “Allah” and that their holy 
book is the Koran; however, 47 percent felt confident enough to respond that “Islam is 
more likely to encourage violence compared to other religions.”
47
   
The magnitude of these numbers was yet further proof that the government’s 
outward stance had not been very successful in swaying a large proportion of the public, 
and it also strengthened the claim, brought by many Arab Americans, that mixed 
messages were being sent by the U.S. government during this time.  Official statements 
exhorted the public to not “view Muslims or Arabs differently than anyone else,” but 
they were followed up by the arrests and detentions of at least 1,200 persons of “almost 
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exclusively Arab, Muslim, or South Asian heritage because of ‘possible’ links to 
terrorism.”
48
  Additionally, Brooklyn College Professor Moustafa Bayoumi added: “as 
President Bush proclaims that the nation is ready to fight for freedom in the rest of the 
world, almost half of the American public seems prepared to curtail the freedom of their 
neighbors here at home.”
49
  Also in reaction to the survey results reported above, 
Hisham Rifaey, a former president of the Muslim Students Association at the University 
of Rochester, decided that Muslim Americans needed to “take a greater responsibility to 
prove to non Muslims that they are average Americans and not violent people,” 
especially since it appeared to him that the public was going to generalize their actions 
anyway.
50
  This was a very ominous suggestion because it mirrored the advice given by 
the JACL to its members during their struggle to avoid internment in the midst of the 
volatile anti-Japanese movement that swept over America after Pearl Harbor.  Like the 
Nisei, however, Rifaey learned from experience (the FBI questioned his friends about 
his loyalty) that his birth in the U.S. meant little in the face of persistent public fears and 
negative opinions of Arabs and Muslims. 
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JUSTIFICATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 
Undeniably, public opinion has played a large role in shaping presidential 
policies.  When both Roosevelt and Bush found themselves at the head of a nation 
desperate for revenge against its enemies, they, along with teams of advisers, had to 
deliberate and decide on a course of action.  At the end of deliberations, both Presidents 
essentially signed their names into history by issuing controversial orders that not only 
tested the limits of executive power, but also tested the strength of the Constitution’s 
bedrock principles contained in the Bill of Rights. 
 
 After Pearl Harbor some of the highest-ranking government and military officials 
became engaged in inter-departmental collaboration and debate over the best solution for 
dealing with the ethnic Japanese population on the West Coast.  Of course, President 
Roosevelt would have the final say, but Army Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, head 
of the Western Defense Command, quickly became the central figure in the decision-
making process.  Interestingly, DeWitt’s career leading up to his final appointment in 
1939 as commander of the Presidio in San Francisco, had very little to do with actual 
combat operations.  He worked mostly as a supply officer, and finally as quartermaster 
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general in 1930.  Nevertheless, his judgment of “military necessity” on the West Coast 
weighed heavily in Roosevelt’s ultimate decision to authorize internment.  There were, 
however, several other men in addition to DeWitt, who, acting from their particular 
posts, played significant parts in the events following Pearl Harbor.   
An account of the meetings, discussions, and policies will proceed, but first of 
all, it must be noted that the attack against Pearl Harbor was only one in a long line of 
Imperial Japanese naval victories in the Pacific.  Simultaneously with the Pearl Harbor 
bombing, the Japanese struck against Malaysia, Hong Kong, the Philippines, and Wake 
and Midway Islands.  The following week was filled with victories over Allied forces in 
Thailand, Guam, and off the Malay Peninsula.  Therefore, it is easy to understand the 
extreme sense of urgency felt by commanders on the West Coast, who feared a possible 
mainland invasion.   
Along with the mentioned Public Proclamations issued on December 7
th
 and 8
th
 
by the President, according to DeWitt’s Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the 
West Coast 1942, Attorney General Francis Biddle also was given “the authority to 
declare prohibited zones, to which enemy aliens were denied admittance or from which 
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they could be excluded in any case where national security required.”
51
  Also mentioned 
earlier, it was during this time that over one thousand enemy aliens, pre-judged by 
intelligence services as “dangerous,” were arrested and assigned to Department of 
Justice facilities.  In spite of these arrests, during the closing weeks of December, 
General DeWitt “requested that the War Department induce the Department of Justice to 
take vigorous action along the Pacific Coast.”  He based this request on his suspicion 
that “unauthorized radio communications,” emanating from the coast, were contributing 
to attacks on American shipping by enemy submarines.
52
  The legitimacy of this 
suspicion was tested by the FBI, and contrary to DeWitt’s claims, “no identifiable cases 
of such signaling were substantiated.”
53
  Furthermore, as included in the JACL’s 
statement to the 1980 U.S. House of Representatives hearings to establish a commission 
on wartime relocation and internment of civilians, “in a meeting with General DeWitt 
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and his staff on January 9, 1942, the Chief of the Federal Communication Commission’s 
Radio Intelligence Division reported that ‘there had been no illegitimate radio 
transmission or signaling from the Japanese or other coastal residents.’”
54
  In fact, the 
first hostile ship-to-shore attack documented by DeWitt did not take place until February 
23, 1942, when an enemy submarine shelled Goleta, near Santa Barbara, California, 
targeting “vital oil installations.”
55
  Nevertheless, in late January 1942 a far-reaching 
agreement was struck between the War Department, the Attorney General, the FBI, and 
the Office of the Provost Marshal General, in which most notably the Attorney General 
designated 99 prohibited zones and 2 restricted zones in California, the Justice 
Department committed to enemy alien registration through finger printing and 
photographing, and new rules on searches and seizures were implemented.  The 
prohibited and restricted zones were generally small and placed along coastal areas, 
thereby displacing only a small number of aliens (U.S. citizens were not affected by this 
program), who were usually able to move to other locations within the same cities.
56
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Conversely, the new search and seizure program was much less accommodating.  The 
rules negated the need for any type of warrant before searching someone’s home in 
“emergency” situations, with the only requirement being that the home was occupied 
solely by aliens.  Enemy “contraband” was sought in these searches, and DeWitt cited a 
case to help prove his point, where the FBI made a “spot raid” in Monterey, California 
on February 12, 1942, and “found more than 60,000 rounds of ammunition and many 
rifles, shotguns and maps of all kinds.”
57
  Again, however, in “Personal Justice Denied: 
Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians,” it was 
explained that “the FBI did confiscate arms and contraband from some ethnic Japanese, 
but most were items normally in the possession of any law-abiding civilian, and the FBI 
concluded that these searches uncovered no dangerous persons that ‘we could not 
otherwise know about.’”
58
   
 Aside from the FBI’s initial roundup of suspected subversives, few plans had 
been made for a large-scale forced evacuation, and this fact did not escape DeWitt.  In a 
January 5 memo to Assistant Attorney General James Rowe, Jr., DeWitt advocated 
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“careful advanced planning to provide against such economic and social dislocations as 
might ensue from any necessary mass evacuation.”
59
  Thus, as early as January 5, 
General DeWitt was considering mass evacuations, and at this indication, Attorney 
General Biddle began his subtle defiance of such plans.  In the meantime, however, 
DeWitt had requested that Biddle create additional prohibited zones in Arizona, Oregon, 
and Washington, but on February 9, Biddle notified Secretary of War Stimson that he 
would not support this second request.  In a letter, Biddle said:  
Your recommendation of prohibited areas for Oregon and Washington 
include the cities of Portland, Seattle and Tacoma and therefore 
contemplate a mass evacuation of many thousands. . . .  No reasons were 
given for this mass evacuation. . . .  The proclamations directing the 
Department of Justice to apprehend, and where necessary, evacuate alien 
enemies, do not, of course, include American citizens of Japanese race.  If 
they have to be evacuated, I believe that this would have to be done as a 
military necessity in the particular areas.  Such action, therefore, should 
in my opinion, be taken by the War Department and not by the 
Department of Justice.
60
 
 
From this point on, a clear difference in opinion existed between these two 
cabinet-level departments, as both felt it was best that the other handled the logistics of 
any further evacuation policies.  However, once it became clear that Biddle was not 
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going to act, Provost Marshal General Allen W. Gullion began a campaign to transfer 
the “responsibility for conduct of the enemy alien program from the Department of 
Justice to the War Department.”  Acting with initiative, on December 26, 1941, Gullion 
pressed DeWitt in a phone conversation to call for the incarceration of all Japanese in the 
Los Angeles area, but DeWitt, “who would blow hot and cold,” was, on that day, 
opposed.  His response to Gullion was: “I’m very doubtful that it would be common 
sense procedure to try and intern 117,000 Japanese in this theater. . . .  An American 
citizen, after all, is an American citizen.  And while they may not be loyal, I think we 
can weed the disloyal out of the loyal and lock them up if necessary.”
61
  Both offices 
sensed the competition heating up, as each sent a representative to meet personally with 
DeWitt in San Francisco.  The Attorney General’s office sent James Rowe, Jr., and the 
Provost Marshal General’s office sent Major Karl R Bendetsen, chief of the Aliens 
Division.  Daniels wrote that Rowe, Jr. “exercised a moderating influence on the 
cautious General De Witt, who often seemed to be the creature of the last strong 
personality with whom he had contact.”  Bendetsen, on the other hand, represented 
Gullion’s hard-line desire for complete “exclusion of the Japanese on the West Coast.”  
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According to Daniels, the military’s side won, because “Bendetsen soon became the 
voice of General De Witt.”  However, in a further grasp for power, “Gullion arranged 
with De Witt that the West Coast commander go out of normal channels and deal 
directly with the Provost Marshal” on alien affairs, which resulted in taking Army Chief 
of Staff George C. Marshall virtually out of the evacuation planning process during the 
months of January and February.
62
   
The effects of this bureaucratic power grab were amazing.  In a few days 
DeWitt’s entire attitude reversed to mirror that of Gullion.  He declared, “I don’t want to 
go after this thing piece meal.  I want to do it on a mass basis.”
63
  DeWitt, now firmly 
entrenched in the idea of evacuation, kept building his case for military necessity.  One 
of his most questionable arguments dealt with his lack of faith in anyone’s ability to 
gauge the loyalty of the Japanese, which he communicated in his Final Report:  
While it is believed that some were loyal, it was known that many were 
not.  It was impossible to establish the identity of the loyal and the 
disloyal with any degree of safety.  It was not there was insufficient time 
                                                 
62
 Daniels, Concentration Camps 44. 
63
 Daniels, Concentration Camps 45. 
  
37 
in which to make such a determination; it was simply a matter of facing 
the realities that a positive determination could not be made, that an exact 
separation of the ‘sheep from the goats’ was unfeasible.
64
 
This claim is outrageous in many regards.  It completely contradicts his December 26, 
1941 comments to Gullion as reported above, it goes against the findings of Curtis B. 
Munson, and it would also discredit the government’s use of loyalty questionnaires 
inside the internment camps as decisive tools in ascertaining internee loyalties.  
Additionally, if as DeWitt said, there was no issue of time, then, wondered the JACL, 
“why weren’t individual charges and trials given to suspected disloyal persons of 
Japanese ancestry?  The courts were in operation . . . why weren’t they used?”
65
  Along 
with the JACL, Biddle, Rowe, Jr., and Edward Ennis of the Alien Enemy Control Unit, 
FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover also felt as though mass evacuation was unnecessary.  
Hoover was quoted as saying, “the necessity for mass evacuation is based primarily 
upon public and political pressure rather than on factual data.”
66
  Nevertheless, the 
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lobbying persisted despite the criticisms of several presidential advisers, and those who 
had the ear of DeWitt continued to be the most powerful in shaping alien policies.  
  
After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government also scrambled in desperation to 
respond.  Prominent national figures in the Departments of Defense, Justice, and State 
played leading roles in the ensuing debate over the nation’s terrorism policy.  Most 
notable were Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Attorney General John Ashcroft, 
and Secretary of State Colin Powell, who once the enemy had been identified, led their 
departments in aggressive attempts to influence President Bush’s course of action.  In so 
doing, they helped usher the U.S. into unprecedented legal and moral debates because, 
unlike WWII, the enemies were not official state actors, and thus many of the old rules 
of conduct in war were supposedly inadequate.   
Central to publicized U.S. aims was the investigation, capture, and prosecution of 
all those responsible for or involved in the 9/11 attacks, and this created the need for 
revamped legal and judicial procedures.  The often repeated goal of President Bush was 
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to pursue the terrorists in order to “drive them out and bring them to justice.”
67
  Seizing 
on this opportunity, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales became another central 
figure in the policy debate, and throughout the process, his opinions, although sometimes 
contrary to those of cabinet officials, appeared to be favored by the President.   
The government acted quickly to give Bush expanded executive powers.  The 
nation was in a state of fear and unease, and recognizing this Bush proclaimed a national 
emergency on September 14, 2001, called the Declaration of National Emergency by 
Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks (Proc. 7463).  Contrasting WWII, however, there 
was no congressional declaration of war.  Instead, on September 14 Congress passed 
Senate Joint Resolution 23, in accordance with the War Powers Act of 1973.  Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution reserves the right to declare wars to Congress, but during 
the Cold War years the United States became involved in undeclared wars in Korea and 
Vietnam.  For those reasons and for the concern of Congress over its apparent “erosion” 
in authority to control the nation’s entrance into wars, it passed the War Powers 
Resolution (over President Nixon’s veto) on November 7, 1973.  It stated that:  
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The President’s powers as Commander-in-Chief to introduce U.S. forces 
into hostilities or imminent hostilities are exercised only pursuant to (1) a 
declaration of war; (2) specific statutory authorization; or (3) a national 
emergency created by an attack on the United States or its forces.  It 
requires the President in every possible instance to consult with Congress 
before introducing American armed forces into hostilities or imminent 
hostilities unless there has been a declaration of war or other specific 
congressional authorization.
68
 
 
Therefore, on September 14, the resolution titled “Authorization for Use of Military 
Force,” passed by votes in the Senate and the House of 98-0 and 420-1.  Included in the 
language was authorization for the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks,” and to intervene “in order to prevent any 
future acts of international terrorism against the United States.”
69
  Clearly, the nation 
rallied around its leader with vital bi-partisan support during this extreme time of 
uncertainty. 
 Bush’s surge in executive power continued its acceleration when on September 
17 he issued a document called a “presidential finding” which “gave the Central 
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Intelligence Agency broad authorization to disrupt terrorist activity, including 
permission to kill, capture and detain members of al Qaeda anywhere in the world.”
70
  
The characteristics of this finding, along with its preceding and following policies, 
illustrate the lengths to which Bush was willing to go in pursuit of al Qaeda, and they 
also demonstrate some very integral differences between WWII and the War on Terror.  
Rather than facing an easily defined and located enemy such as Imperial Japan, Bush 
faced dangerous men often hiding among rural populations or in remote cave complexes.  
And, more importantly for this thesis, rather than feeling threatened by military invasion 
and domestic espionage, after the initial sweep of arrests, Bush viewed and spoke of his 
enemies as kinds of international criminals who were simply evading arrest.  On October 
10, 2001, Bush said: “Terrorists try to operate in the shadows.  They try to hide.  But 
we’re going to shine the light of justice on them.”
71
  Therefore, rather than a military 
barrage, “President Bush launched the first offensive in the war on terrorism on 
September 23 by signing an Executive Order freezing the U.S.-based assets of those 
individuals and organizations involved with terrorism.”  In all, 196 countries and 
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jurisdictions supported the financial war on terror, which froze assets worldwide and 
helped strain 39 entities designated as terrorist organizations by the State Department at 
the request of Attorney General Ashcroft.
72
   
 Military operations were being planned, and in a September 25 memo from 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General John C. Yoo to Timothy Flanigan, the Deputy 
Counsel to the President, Yoo declared that Bush had constitutional authority to strike 
militarily against terrorists worldwide.  According to Yoo, the Senate’s Joint Resolution 
gave only narrow authorization to attack those nations or people that were involved in 
9/11; however, it was Yoo’s opinion that “the President’s broad constitutional power to 
use military force to defend the Nation, recognized by the Joint Resolution itself, would 
allow the President to take whatever actions he deems appropriate to pre-empt or 
respond to terrorist threats from new quarters.”  Yoo continued, “In the exercise of his 
plenary power to use military force, the President’s decisions are for him alone and are 
unreviewable.”
73
  This demonstrated a bold attitude taken by the executive toward 
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legislative and judicial oversight, and it showed the inkling of anti-terror policies that 
would later extend well beyond the confines of simply responding to the 9/11 attacks.   
Moving swiftly on the advice of Yoo and others, and at the urgings of a nation 
thirsting for retaliation, Bush launched Operation Enduring Freedom, which included 
assaults on and the invasion of Afghanistan.  In his presidential address to the nation on 
that same day, he explained that the attacks were “against al Qaeda terrorist training 
camps and military installations of the Taliban regime,” and that they were “carefully 
targeted actions . . . designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of 
operations.”  Bush also acknowledged the fear felt by many Americans, but he offered 
words of assurance as only a Commander-in-Chief could, by saying: “We will not 
waiver; we will not tire; we will not falter; and we will not fail.  Peace and freedom will 
prevail.”  Mirroring Yoo’s memo, he warned, “today we focus on Afghanistan, but the 
battle is broader.”
74
  With that, U.S. military involvement in the War on Terror had 
begun, and completely dissimilar to WWII, there was no foreseeable end because, as 
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Bush and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld have reiterated, “the enemy is not a nation—
the enemy is terrorist networks that threaten the way of life of all peaceful people.”
75
 
Next on the Bush agenda was to augment the investigatory powers of U.S. law 
enforcement through expanding the reach of the Department of Justice.  The reasoning 
was that the new threats had rendered many of the old laws and tools inadequate, 
creating the need for updated, expanded replacements.  Therefore, (much like the 
policies agreed upon by several branches of the government and enacted by Attorney 
General Biddle in early 1942 to lessen the legal constraints on the FBI) on October 26, 
2001, with an overwhelming endorsement by Congress, Bush signed into law the 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act).  Upon signing, the 
President praised the bill, that it took “account of the new realities and dangers posed by 
modern terrorists.”
76
  The Justice Department promoted the act as part of the “national 
commitment to the protection of civil rights and civil liberties,” but civil rights activists 
were not convinced, as they were quick to criticize Congress and the President for 
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passing something that allowed for such intrusions into personal privacy.
77
  Where the 
government insisted in the act’s usefulness for preventing future terrorist attacks, its 
critics cautioned that its expanded search and surveillance powers, along with the 
limiting or removing of judicial oversight during investigations, were excessive, 
unnecessary, and might “do more to expose us to terrorist attacks than protect us.”
78
  In 
fact, in the introduction for America’s Disappeared: Secret Imprisonment, Detainees, 
and the “War on Terror,” Rachel Meeropol, an attorney at the Center for Constitutional 
Rights, worried that fear and pressure applied by Ashcroft essentially led Congress to 
pass the revolutionary expansion of executive powers in such little time and with “little 
public debate or discussion.”  She continued that the act “was passed by a Congress that 
had been evacuated from anthrax-contaminated offices” and that lived through 
“continuous alerts of more terrorist attacks.”  She concluded that the “USA PATRIOT 
Act was sold to a Congress and a public eager to do anything necessary to stop 
terrorism.”
79
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Despite these concerns, the act and all of its provisions were put into place, and 
as of May 5, 2004, the Department of Justice had “charged 310 defendants with criminal 
offenses as a result of terrorism investigations,” with 179 convictions having been 
handed down.
80
  Therefore, the oft-publicized importance of the PATRIOT Act’s 
successes and those of its related policies gave continual credence to Bush’s most hard-
line advisers, and as the war raged around the globe, new issues began to rise as 
prisoners and other casualties accumulated, prompting further debate and policy 
implementation. 
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PRESIDENTIAL ORDERS 
In early February 1942, President Roosevelt was becoming increasingly 
convinced of the necessity for decisive action concerning the “Japanese question” on the 
West Coast.  Public opinion continued to reflect the hateful views of powerful news 
media outlets like the Los Angeles Times, whose columnist W.H. Anderson deemed 
“Japanese Americans as ‘vipers’ loyal to Japan, who posed a ‘potential and menacing’ 
danger to the country,” and California Governor Culbert Olson echoed this view on 
January 27, when he commented that, “since the publication of the Roberts Report” the 
people of California “feel that they are living in the midst of enemies.”
81
  Additionally, 
the pressure being applied by U.S. military leaders began to wear on Attorney General 
Biddle, who began preparing for the real possibility of a mass evacuation order and or 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.  According to author Greg Robinson, one 
possible explanation for Biddle’s shrinking opposition was that he “preferred to 
demonstrate his willingness to cooperate in the relocation of aliens in order to better 
persuade the President not to evacuate citizens as well.”  Therefore, it appeared that 
Biddle had become convinced that some type of evacuation would occur, and in answer 
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to a Senate committee’s questions on February 5, he opined that a mass removal “could 
be constitutionally carried out by the army in case of military necessity.”
82
  Indications 
suggest that Biddle still believed that a military necessity had not been established, and 
somewhat ironically, he was joined in this belief by Secretary of War Stimson.  
Nevertheless, as of February 9, Stimson had decided to approve De Witt’s and 
Bendetsen’s evacuation plan that included American citizens, despite being “wary of the 
constitutional implications of the policy” and feeling “doubts as to whether national 
security justified such an extreme step.”
83
   
Given the state of public and military opinions, and with mounting congressional 
pressure, especially from West Coast politicians, Roosevelt felt compelled to act.  
Guided by a draft prepared by Gullion and others, on February 19, 1942, Roosevelt 
issued Executive Order 9066.  The order authorized the Secretary of War to prescribe 
military areas and to provide for “protection against espionage and against sabotage to 
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national-defense material.”
84
  It continued that the Secretary of War might designate 
military commanders to:  
prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the 
appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all 
persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any 
person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever 
restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander 
may impose in his discretion.  The Secretary of War is hereby authorized 
to provide for residents of any such area who are excluded therefrom, 
such transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be 
necessary.
85
 
Robinson quickly pointed out that through this order Roosevelt assumed that the 
Japanese ancestry of over 100,000 people “made them so likely to engage in subversive 
activities” that they should be “collectively deported from the excluded area.”  Further, 
he noted that “no other American citizens, regardless of ethnic background, were 
subjected to such treatment.”
86
  Most importantly for this research, however, was the 
“unprecedented assertion of executive power” contained within the order.  Robinson 
contended that: 
the President imposed military rule on civilians without a declaration of 
martial law, and he sentenced a segment of the population to internal 
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exile (and ultimately forced incarceration) under armed guard, 
notwithstanding that the writ of habeas corpus had not been suspended by 
Congress (to whom such power was reserved by the Constitution).  More 
importantly, Executive Order 9066 was unprecedented in the extent of its 
racially defined infringement of the basic rights of American citizens.
87
  
Therefore, the order’s infringements and the controversy surrounding them are the 
factors that have allowed for a comparison to be made between E.O. 9066 and the 
eventual military orders of President Bush with regards to treatment of terrorism 
suspects.     
  
By early November 2001, the fighting in Afghanistan and in other areas abroad 
was producing hundreds of foreign prisoners.  Sticking to his theme of pursuing the war 
as a way to bring terrorists to justice and as a way to deal with such a large burden of 
prisoners, President Bush issued his Military Order of November 13, 2001—Detention, 
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism.  As 
Commander-in-Chief, Bush claimed far-reaching powers and privileges to his office that 
were unprecedented in American history and thus untested constitutionally.  Some of the 
more notable and controversial lines from this order were: 
Section 1. Findings. 
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(e) To protect the United States and its citizens, and for the 
effective conduct of military operations and prevention of terrorist 
attacks, it is necessary for individuals subject to this order pursuant to 
section 2 hereof to be detained, and, when tried, to be tried for violations 
of the laws of war and other applicable laws by military tribunals. 
Section 2. Definition and Policy. 
(a) The term “individual subject to this order” shall mean any 
individual who is not a United States citizen with respect to whom I 
determine . . . . 
Section 3. Detention Authority of the Secretary of Defense. Any 
individual subject to this order shall be 
(a) detained at an appropriate location designated by the Secretary 
of Defense outside or within the United States; 
(b) treated humanely, without any adverse distinction based on 
race, color, religion, gender, birth, wealth, or any similar criteria; 
Section 4. Authority of the Secretary of Defense Regarding Trials 
of Individuals Subject to this Order. 
(c) . . . rules for the conduct of the proceedings of military 
commissions . . . shall at a minimum provide for 
(8) submission of the record of the trial, including any 
conviction or sentence, for review and final decision by me or by 
the Secretary of Defense if so designated by me for that purpose.
88
  
The effects of this order were felt all over the world, but this thesis is focused primarily 
on its impact on the terrorism suspects held at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba, who began arriving to the facility known as Camp X-Ray on January 16, 2002.  
Barbara Olshansky, the Assistant Legal Director of the Center for Constitutional Rights, 
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was particularly alarmed by many of the provisions contained in the November 13 order.  
She specifically pointed out that in the case of a military commission proceeding, Bush 
had given himself the power to “conduct the entire process, including executions in 
secret, without any accountability to Congress, the courts, or the American public.”  
Additionally, Olshansky wondered why the order’s detention provisions completely 
contrasted those of Congress’ USA PATRIOT Act.  She noted that whereas the Act 
required that “non-citizens who are detained by the government be charged with a crime 
or immigration violation within seven days of their detention,” the military order 
included no time limitations for “informing those detained of the charges against them,” 
nor any avenues for judicial review.
89
  In fact, the November 13 order explicitly stated 
that those subject to it “shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any 
proceeding . . . in any court of the United States, or any state thereof, any court of any 
foreign nation, or any international tribunal.”
90
  Ultimately, Olshansky was left to 
consider Bush’s order as a “blatant and profound example of unlawful Presidential 
overreaching” that called into question the nation’s credibility as a democracy for its 
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apparent willingness to relinquish “constitutional rights and breach international 
standards of basic human rights in the pursuit of punishing suspected enemies.”
91
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SUBSEQUENT ORDERS AND THEIR EFFECTS 
President Roosevelt was less than three months removed from his post-Pearl 
Harbor declaration, “We will not under any threat, or in face of any danger, surrender 
the guarantees of liberty our forefathers framed for us in the Bill of Rights,” when he set 
in motion the evacuation process with E.O. 9066.  And, although the order did not 
specifically focus on any one ethnic group, Biddle’s statement in a February 20, 1942 
memo for the President revealed the document’s true intent: “The order is not limited to 
aliens but includes citizens so that it can be exercised with respect to Japanese 
irrespective of their citizenship.”
92
  Also on February 20, Lieutenant General De Witt 
was designated as Commander of the Western Defense Command, which comprised the 
Pacific states, among others.  His first major action in accordance with E.O. 9066 came 
on March 2, when he delivered Public Proclamation No. 1.  This proclamation, the first 
of many, established that the geographical location of the region along the Pacific Coast 
subjected it to the imminent threat of enemy attack and or espionage and sabotage, thus 
creating a state of “military necessity” whereby Military Areas and Zones would need to 
be established.  It continued that “‘such persons or classes of persons as the situation 
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may require’ would, by subsequent proclamation, be excluded from certain of these 
areas, but might be permitted to enter or remain in certain others.”
93
  Finally, Public 
Proclamation No. 1 designated southern Arizona and the entire U.S. Pacific Coast as 
Military Area No. 1, and Military Area No. 2 encompassed the rest of the coastal states 
and of Arizona.  Roosevelt then issued Executive Order 9102, which established the War 
Relocation Authority (WRA).  The job of this department would be to handle all aspects 
of the removal and relocation of the persons designated under Executive Order 9066.  
Equally vital to the success of any such programs, however, was the congressional 
mandate received in the form of the Act of March 21, 1942.  It provided misdemeanor 
penalties including fines, imprisonment, or both for persons who knowingly violated 
military or Executive orders.  In a sense, this was the backbone of the whole internment 
issue because it allowed the Supreme Court, in its eventual decisions, to look upon the 
whole evacuation process as having been well-evaluated and approved of by the 
President, the Congress, and the Military.  
 At the same time, De Witt began issuing a series of Civilian Exclusion Orders.  
Building off of the supplied reasoning of Public Proclamation No. 1, these orders put 
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curfews into place for “all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien,” living 
within the affected areas, and also required that a member of each ethnic Japanese family 
report to a Civil Control Station for registration.
94
  Additional proclamations and orders 
progressively constricted the movement and lifestyles of Japanese Americans, until 
finally groups of evacuees were being squeezed into crude Reception and Relocation 
Centers.  It is true that De Witt and Milton S. Eisenhower, the first Director of the WRA, 
attempted a short-term program of voluntary resettlement of the Japanese into more 
inland states, but as the congressional report “Personal Justice Denied” recounted, the 
governors and officials of the mountain states “objected to California using the interior 
states as a ‘dumping ground’ for a California ‘problem.’”
95
  With that, the program of 
resettlement was replaced with relocation, and by late March, the first group of Japanese 
American evacuees from the Las Angeles area had arrived at the Manzanar Reception 
Center.  In this way, the evacuation process proceeded gradually, as old race tracks and 
fair grounds were transformed for temporary housing and the ten major Relocation 
Centers or “internment camps” were built.   
                                                 
94
 Hirabayashi v. United States. 
95
 “Personal Justice Denied” 34. 
  
57 
 On the individual level, it was not uncommon for Japanese American families to 
receive notice of their impending evacuation with only a few days to make arrangements 
for their estate.  Well recorded by John Tateishi in his oral history, the similar stories of 
countless Japanese Americans revealed the hardships endured during these tragic days 
and months.  Mary Tsukamoto, who was interned at the Jerome camp in Arkansas, 
remembered: “We left early in the morning on May 29.  Two days earlier we sold our 
car for eight hundred dollars, which was just about giving it away.”  Emi Somekawa, 
along with her family, started out at the Portland Assembly Center.  “We lived in a horse 
stall from May to September, and my son was born in a horse stall.”
96
  In general, these 
WRA and Wartime Civilian Control Administration facilities were characterized by their 
frequent use of tar paper and chicken wire for construction, and their separation of large 
barracks into family rooms of “no more than 20 by 24 feet,” no matter the size of the 
family.
97
  Additionally, all camps, though operated through the civilian WRA, were 
ringed by barbed wire and watch towers manned by armed military guards.  This final 
characteristic helped lead to at least three shooting deaths of internees: one at Topaz, in 
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Utah, and two at Manzanar, in California.  “Camp living was not without its 
discontentment,” noted Ng, and “tensions erupted from time to time.”
98
  Secretary of the 
Interior Harold Ickes said this of the camps in 1946: “We gave the fancy name of 
‘relocation centers’ to these dust bowls, but they were concentration camps 
nonetheless.”
99
   
 In spite of all the pre-evacuation arguments of military necessity and those that 
would later be made before the Supreme Court, two impeccable objections remained.  
The first and most obvious dealt with the highly dense Japanese population on the 
Hawaiian Islands.  At the time of Pearl Harbor, 37.3 percent of the islands’ population 
was ethnic Japanese, and although this did raise a concern within the government, 
ultimately only 1 percent of the Hawaiian Japanese was ever incarcerated.
100
  This led 
the JACL, in their congressional testimony, to inquire: “if, as DeWitt stated, ‘there is no 
way to determine their loyalty,’ it is even more curious that the Japanese Americans in 
Hawaii were not similarly subjected to wholesale and indiscriminate incarceration,” 
especially given that “Hawaii was 3,000 miles closer to the enemy and in far greater 
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danger of invasion and sabotage.”
101
  Needless to say, the government’s explanation that 
Hawaiian internment didn’t take place because of the economic necessity of Japanese 
workers wasn’t satisfying in several regards.  Secondly, and most damaging, was that 
even Congress has held that after the Allied naval victory at Midway in June of 1942, 
“the possibility of serious Japanese attack was no longer credible.”
102
  This is 
particularly disturbing because as of June 1, 1942, only “a little more than 17,000 
persons of Japanese ancestry” resided in the “government concentration camps.”
103
  By 
the end of the war that number reached 120,313 persons, “76,000 of whom were 
American citizens.”  More than anything, these are the issues that have led historians and 
other civic leaders to the conclusion reached by the JACL, that: “The evacuation was 
racially, politically and economically motivated,” and “‘under the guise of national 
defense, evacuation became an end in itself, a fortuitous wartime opportunity to rid the 
western states’ of their Japanese populations.”
104
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 Eventually, the orders that created the need for the camps were rescinded on 
December 17, 1944, suspiciously one day before the Supreme Court handed down its 
decision in the Ex Parte Endo case, which freed all admittedly loyal internees.  
Nevertheless, this painful period in U.S. history did not officially end until the Tule Lake 
camp closed in March of 1946. 
  
In January 2002, as Camp X-Ray’s wire-cage holding cells filled with detainees 
from abroad, discussions within the Bush administration focused on appropriate prisoner 
treatment and legal classification.  As a primary designation, Bush used the term “enemy 
combatant” quite broadly to cover many of those detained by the U.S., both citizens and 
non-citizens.  According to Tennessee Congresswoman Marsha Blackburn, the 
Department of Defense defined an enemy combatant as: “an individual who was part of 
or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in 
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.  This includes any person 
who committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy 
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forces.”
105
  It is also clear that Bush reserved the right to himself to designate detainees 
as enemy combatants, and those so designated could be held indefinitely without charges 
and without access to legal counsel.  On top of the “enemy combatant” classification, a 
debate erupted between Bush’s advisers over the proper application of the Geneva 
Conventions with regards to the al Qaeda and Taliban detainees.  Additionally, Bush had 
his legal advisers opining on the jurisdictional question of whether or not Guantanamo 
Bay detainees might be successful in their attempts to petition writs of habeas corpus 
from U.S. courts.  Finally, the third major debate, although related to the application of 
Geneva rights, centered on determining proper and acceptable interrogation tactics to be 
used on the most resistant detainees.  Thus, the year following the 9/11 attacks was 
characterized by the consideration and implementation of unprecedented policies, which 
were followed by intense debate and scrutiny.   
The U.S. military and its allies were making steady progress in the Afghan 
theatre in early 2002, on their way to removing the Taliban from power.  Therefore, 
attention turned to the two most urgent objectives in the war—to find Osama bin Laden, 
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al Qaeda’s leader, and to prevent the “next” terrorist attack against the U.S.  As a 
casualty to this new focus, it would appear that Bush’s oft-repeated intention to bring the 
terrorists to justice was temporarily put on hold, as their capture, detention, and 
interrogation was more of a priority.  In fact, it wasn’t until July 2003 that Bush deemed 
the first six detainees eligible for Military Tribunals.  Meanwhile, Washington’s policy 
makers were working to come up with legal justifications for whether or not it was 
proper to apply the Geneva Conventions’ provisions to the prisoners, often called “the 
worst of the worst” by Major General Geoffrey Miller (Commander of detainee 
operation at Guantanamo as of November 2002).
106
  This process of policy decision 
making was best represented by a series of governmental memos, originating from 
advisers in several different cabinet-level departments.  The first record of these 
discussions is a January 9, 2002 draft memo from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General, and Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, General 
Counsel of the Department of Defense.  In the memo, Yoo and Delahunty set out their 
contention that neither al Qaeda members nor Taliban militia fighters were protected by 
the War Crimes Act (WCA) enacted by Congress in 1996, which incorporated the four 
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1949 Geneva Conventions.  These conventions were generally used as guidelines for the 
treatment of non-combatants, such as prisoners of war (POWs), but Yoo and Delahunty 
responded that, “it seems to us overwhelmingly likely that an armed conflict between a 
Nation State [the U.S.] and a transnational terrorist organization [al Qaeda], or between a 
Nation State and a failed state [Afghanistan] harboring and supporting a transnational 
terrorist organization, could not have been within the contemplation of the drafters.”  
Therefore, it was their conclusion that neither party, al Qaeda or the Taliban, nor the 
conflict being led by the U.S. against them, fell under the protections of any U.S.-ratified 
international treaties governing the laws of armed conflict.
107
  Swift action was taken in 
response to these conclusions, as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld wrote a memo for the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 19, which directed the Chairman that 
“Al Qaeda and Taliban individuals under the control of the Department of Defense are 
not entitled to prisoner of war status for purposes of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.”  
The memo continued that detainees should still be treated “humanely and, to the extent 
appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the 
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principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.”
108
  Like an ominous reminder of the 
subjectivity involved in determining “military necessity” during WWII, Rumsfeld’s 
January 19 memo was simply the first of many that suggested military necessity would 
influence the quality of treatment given to terrorism detainees. 
It was unclear exactly when President Bush made his decision on the application 
of the Geneva Conventions to the War on Terror, but Rumsfeld’s January 19 memo gave 
a good indication of the President’s leaning.  Nevertheless, the debate raged on with two 
additional memos taking the stance against application of Geneva and the other 
international treaties.  On January 22, both Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, 
and Haynes II received an updated version of Yoo’s and Delahunty’s draft memo.  
Echoing the earlier expressed sentiments, this memo no doubt influenced Gonzales when 
he addressed a draft memo to the President on January 25.  From the beginning, this 
memo revealed that Bush had already made his decision that Geneva would not apply 
and al Qaeda and Taliban detainees were not to be given POW status.  Additionally, 
Gonzales framed his remarks in the form of a defense of Bush’s decision, because, as he 
noted to Bush, “The Secretary of State has requested that you reconsider that 
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decision.”
109
  Specifically, Secretary of State Powell was asking that the President apply 
the POW protections provided by the Geneva Conventions to both al Qaeda and the 
Taliban, at least until individual hearings were held to determine the final status of each 
detainee.  Gonzales concluded his memo with an effort to present the President with an 
objective look at the positive and negative sides of his decision to not apply Geneva’s 
provisions, but it resulted in a very subjective analysis that seemed to make excuses for 
U.S. actions rather than give legal or moral backing.  In his “Positive” section, Gonzales 
supported Bush’s decision for reasons including: The Geneva Conventions’ prohibitions 
of “outrages against personal dignity” and “inhuman treatment” were left “undefined,” 
which would make it “difficult to predict with confidence what actions might be deemed 
to constitute violations.”  Further, the “difficulty in predicting the “motives of 
prosecutors” in the future made Bush’s decision the safest for reducing the “threat of 
domestic prosecution” of government officials under the War Crimes Act.  In addition, 
the “Negative” section promoted Bush’s decision despite the admissions that it would 
“provoke widespread condemnation,” it might “encourage other countries to look for 
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‘loopholes’ in future conflicts,” and it “could undermine U.S. military culture which 
emphasizes maintaining the highest standards of conduct in combat.”
110
  Consequently, 
Secretary Powell, who stood out as the lead opposition to the presidential 
administration’s plans much like Attorney General Biddle in the 1940s, constructed a 
memo in response to Gonzales’ the following day.   
“I am concerned that the draft does not squarely present to the President the 
options that are available to him,” wrote Powell on January 26.  “Nor does it identify the 
significant pros and cons of each option.”  Along with pointing out several significant 
flaws and inaccuracies in Gonzales’ draft, Powell pushed for Bush to apply the Geneva 
Accords to the conflict if for no other reason than to preserve “U.S. credibility and moral 
authority by taking the high ground.”
111
  Overall, Powell presented an argument that 
took not only the U.S. image abroad into consideration but also the well-being of 
captured U.S. soldiers and the ability of the U.S. to garner international support. 
 President Bush disagreed with Powell.  On February 7, he declared that although 
he would apply Geneva’s provisions to the conflict with the Taliban, neither the Taliban 
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detainees nor those of al Qaeda qualified for POW status.  This meant that, just as 
Rumsfeld’s memo foretold, the U.S. military would “continue to treat detainees 
humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a 
manner consistent with the principles of Geneva,” but without Geneva’s legal 
guarantees.
112
   
Now that the U.S. government had settled on a designation that imparted very 
few rights on its subjects, it became essential that the detainees be prohibited from 
access to the U.S. court system where they might challenge their detention through writs 
of habeas corpus.  Therefore, concurrently with the talks about Geneva, the Bush 
administration gathered support for its claim that the naval base at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba laid outside U.S. judicial reach.  On December 28, 2001, Patrick F. Philbin, 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, along with Yoo had written a memo for Haynes II, 
of the Defense Department, in which they addressed the possibility that a U.S. district 
court might allow a habeas petition to proceed.  They concluded that “the great weight of 
legal authority indicates that a federal district court could not properly exercise habeas 
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jurisdiction over an alien detained” at Guantanamo, but they were not confident enough 
to completely disregard it as a possibility.  The basis for their opinion came from the 
Supreme Court’s 1950 ruling in Johnson v. Eisentrager, which held that “federal courts 
did not have authority to entertain an application for habeas relief filed by an enemy 
alien who had been seized and held at all relevant times outside the territory of the 
United States.”  However, the wording of the 1903 lease agreement with Cuba that 
granted the U.S. “complete jurisdiction and control over and within” the naval base 
worried the Justice Department because it might open the door to those who would argue 
that “complete jurisdiction” was sufficient for habeas jurisdiction.
113
   
Despite these uncertainties, Bush and Rumsfeld proceeded according to the plan 
laid out by the President’s November 13 order for a system of military tribunals to hear 
the cases against those detainees accused of violations of the laws of war.  Accordingly, 
on March 21, 2002, Rumsfeld issued Military Commission Order No. 1 to set out the 
“procedures for Trials by Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens 
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in the War Against Terrorism.”
114
  Essentially, it was a detailed breakdown of the 
commissions’ procedures, personnel, and conduct, but no one would even be declared 
eligible for trial by one of these commissions for more than a year after the order’s 
issuance.   
Critics attacked the Military Commission order.  Barbara Olshansky claimed that 
the protections provided by the commission rules for defendants were “subject to change 
at any time by either the President of the Secretary of Defense,” and the rules were also 
“unenforceable.”
115
  Section 10 of the rules stated:  
This Order is not intended to and does not create any right, benefit, or 
other privilege, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any party, 
against the United States. . . .  Failure to meet a time period specified in 
this Order or supplementary regulations or instructions issued under 
Section 7(A), shall not create a right to relief for the Accused or any other 
person.
116
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Therefore, Olshansky concluded that the protections for those charged and tried would 
be both “unstable and ultimately unenforceable.”
117
 
 No doubt, the most criticized and controversial aspects of Bush’s detainment 
program have been its indefinite nature without plans for criminal prosecution or release, 
and the treatment of detainees, particularly during interrogations.  Christophe Girod, the 
senior Red Cross official in Washington, wrote: “The open-endedness of the situation 
and its impact on the mental health of the population has become a major problem.”  
Citing 32 suicide attempts by 21 detainees in an 18 month time period helped sustain his 
analysis, even though Major General Miller retorted, “We don’t want the enemy 
combatants here to stay one day longer than is necessary.”
118
  
As of June 2005 approximately 520 detainees remained incarcerated at 
Guantanamo, but approximately 234 had departed from the naval base, with 149 gaining 
full release and 83 transferred to the control of their home government.  Congresswoman 
Blackburn found out that the majority of those 83 were subsequently released, and at 
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least 12 had since been found rejoining the fight against coalition forces.
119
  In response, 
“If these men are the ‘worst of the worst,’ how come many were never charged with any 
crime, by any country, asked critic Michael Ratner.  “And why did it take so long to 
determine that they were not terrorists?”  He suggested that “these were men who, had 
there been a fair hearing before some form of tribunal, would have been freed long 
ago.”
120
 
 Upon their arrival, according to former U.S. intelligence soldier at Guantanamo 
Army Sergeant Erik Saar, detainees “were immediately thrown into interrogation booths 
for sessions that could last up to two days.”  Saar’s book gives a detailed account of his 
six-month tour of duty, from December 2002 to June 2003, at the base commonly known 
at “Gitmo,” where he criticized the command structure for the base’s unprofessional 
atmosphere.  One of the interesting practices Saar noticed was that in Camp Delta (the 
permanent facility that replaced Camp X-Ray in April 2002) the word “prisoner” was 
never used, only “detainee.”  “To call them prisoners would be too close to calling them 
POWs,” said Saar, “which would be akin to saying they were protected by international 
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law.”
121
  This practice was remarkably similar to the use of “non-alien” instead of “U.S. 
citizen” in the Civilian Exclusion Orders of General De Witt in 1942 in order to deflect 
the notion that “non-aliens” deserved equal constitutional rights as U.S. citizens.  
Additionally, Saar served as the translator for several interrogations in which his 
conscience suggested that mistreatment of detainees was taking place.  The most notable 
of these involved a female interrogator applying red ink to her hand and then causing the 
detainee to believe that she was wiping menstrual blood on his face.  Her expressed 
intent had been to “put up a barrier between him and his God,” by making him feel 
unclean and unworthy.  This was apparently accomplished as Saar described the look of 
“intense loathing” on the prisoner’s face accompanied by screaming.  What they had 
done “was the antithesis of what the United States is supposed to be about,” Saar 
proclaimed. “We cashed in our principles in the hope of obtaining a piece of 
information.  And it didn’t even fucking work.”
122
   
 In December 2002, near the time Sergeant Saar arrived at Gitmo, the debate over 
proper interrogation techniques heated up.  In response to initial requests from Major 
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General Michael B. Dunlavey, Commander of Joint Task Force 170 at Gitmo, Secretary 
Rumsfeld issued a list of “approved” counter-resistance strategies, some of which 
exceeded the Army’s, Field Manual 34-52 Intelligence Interrogation, which strictly 
forbade the use of “force” in interrogations.
123
  Specifically, these newly approved 
tactics were for use at Gitmo only, and they included the “use of 20-hour interrogations,” 
“removal of clothing,” and “inducing stress by use of detainee’s fears (e.g. dogs).”
124
  
These techniques, however, were short-lived as Rumsfeld rescinded his earlier order on 
January 15, 2003, leaving only the more harmless tactics still available for use. 
 The publicity received by these memoranda and many more like them set off a 
firestorm of negative news reports and public opinion.  Many have joined Karen J. 
Greenberg in her accusation that the whole line of new policies put forth in the 
government memos was a “carefully constructed anticipation of objections at the 
domestic and international levels,” but the “general consensus was that Americans could 
not possibly be involved in such tactics.”
125
  Nevertheless, Americans were in fact 
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involved and responsible, and as of today, Camp Delta and the other detainment 
facilities remain fully operational.  The detainee population is above 400, and the 
Department of Defense has yet to successfully complete even one of its military 
tribunals charging detainees with violations of the laws of war.                                
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SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
There can be no surprise that along with such unprecedented and controversial 
policies enacted, each of the relevant time periods included Supreme Court challenges to 
the constitutionality of executive actions.  With regards to Japanese internment, four 
petitions reached the highest court for consideration on their merits, and in 2004, three 
major cases against President Bush’s detainment policies were decided by the court.  
Although there was only partial success on the part of those interned/detained, their 
cases are most important to this research for their ability to show a pattern of presidential 
excess during times of crisis, and of the court’s recognition and adjustment, over time, to 
this tendency by way of checking executive power. 
 Beginning with the WWII era, there were four major cases, with two decided on 
June 21, 1943 and the other two on December 18, 1944.  The suits brought by Kiyoshi 
Hirabayashi and Minoru Yasui were deemed companion cases, and because of their 
similarities, an analysis of Hirabayashi v. U.S. will suffice.  Mr. Hirabayashi was an 
American citizen of Japanese ancestry, who quite purposely violated General De Witt’s 
curfew order and a Civilian Exclusion Order for his home area in the state of 
Washington.  These violations led to his conviction and sentencing, as provided for by 
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the Congressional Act of March 21, 1942, to two three month prison terms to be served 
concurrently.  Therefore, the questions brought before the Supreme Court were whether 
the curfew order and or the exclusion order were unconstitutional delegations of power 
from Congress to the military commander, and “whether the restriction 
unconstitutionally discriminated between citizens of Japanese ancestry and those of 
other ancestries in violation of the Fifth Amendment.”  In answer to these questions, the 
court unanimously found that it was “within the constitutional power of Congress and 
the executive arm of the Government to prescribe this curfew order” as a wartime 
measure to protect against espionage and sabotage, and the court continued that “in time 
of war residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greater 
source of danger than those of a different ancestry.”  It was also put forth that the “war 
power of the national government is ‘the power to wage war successfully,’” which 
extended to all areas and was “not restricted to the winning of victories in the field.”
126
  
All of these reasons led to the unanimous affirmation of the curfew order and of 
Hirabayashi’s conviction for violating it.  Additionally, the court avoided even 
addressing the exclusion order by reasoning that his “sentences on the two counts are to 
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run concurrently and conviction on the second [the curfew conviction] is sufficient to 
sustain the sentence.”  Interestingly, in a somewhat reluctant concurring opinion, Justice 
Murphy warned of executive excess when he wrote the following: “We give great 
deference to the judgment of Congress and the military authorities as to what is 
necessary in the effective prosecution of the war, but we can never forget that there are 
constitutional boundaries which it is our duty to uphold.”
127
 
 Moving forward to December 18, 1944, the Supreme Court ruled in another pair 
of related internment cases.  The significant and controlling difference between these 
two cases was that whereas “Fred” Toyosaburo Korematsu had challenged the exclusion 
orders by failing to report to an assembly center, Mitsuye Endo challenged her 
internment from within the camps.  This difference, although minor, proved deciding.  In 
Ex Parte Endo, Ms. Endo was granted her full liberty, as the court ruled unanimously 
that “whatever power the War Relocation Authority may have to detain other classes of 
citizens, it has no authority to subject citizens who are concededly loyal to its leave 
procedure.”
128
  Nevertheless, although her petition for a writ of habeas corpus was 
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eventually successful, she had been incarcerated for over two years before the Supreme 
Court granted her relief.  In Korematsu v. U.S., the court reached a 6-3 decision against 
Mr. Korematsu upholding his lower-court convictions.  Justice Black wrote the court’s 
opinion and he included: “Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because 
of hostility to him or his race,” but rather because authorities “decided that the military 
urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated 
from the West Coast temporarily” and because Congress placed its confidence and 
authority in the military to make these judgments.
129
  Somewhat ironically, Justice 
Roberts, the author of the famous Roberts Report which had aided the formation of anti-
Asian hysteria after Pearl Harbor, dissented from the court’s decision.  Additionally, 
Justices Murphy and Jackson dissented, with Murphy again offering powerful words:  
No adequate reason is given for the failure to treat these Japanese 
Americans on an individual basis by holding investigations and hearings 
to separate the loyal from the disloyal, as was done in the case of persons 
of German and Italian ancestry.  It is merely that the loyalties of this 
group ‘were unknown and time was of the essence.’  Yet nearly four 
months elapsed after Pearl Harbor before the first exclusion order was 
issued; nearly eight months went by until the last order was issued; and 
the last of these ‘subversive’ persons was not actually removed until 
almost eleven months had elapsed.  Leisure and deliberation seem to have 
been more of the essence than speed.  And the fact that conditions were 
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not such as to warrant a declaration of martial law adds strength to the 
belief that the factors of time and military necessity were not as urgent as 
they have been represented to be.
130
 
  
To date, the War on Terror has seen three major Supreme Court decisions handed 
down in response to challenges of President Bush’s detainment powers over enemy 
combatants.  All three were decided on June 28, 2004, and with the exception of 
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, they were resounding defeats for the President’s administration.  
Padilla, a U.S. citizen, was arrested by federal agents as he stepped off an airplane in 
Chicago, in connection with a grand jury investigation into the 9/11 attacks.  President 
Bush then issued an order to Rumsfeld that designated Padilla as an enemy combatant, 
which affected Padilla’s transfer to military detention in a naval brig in South Carolina.  
As a citizen, he filed a petition that alleged his “military detention violates the 
Constitution.”  The district court agreed with the government that the “President has 
authority as Commander in Chief to detain as enemy combatants citizens captured on 
American soil during a time of war;” however, the appeals court disagreed, “holding that 
the President lacks authority to detain Padilla militarily.”
131
  This laid the ground for a 
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Supreme Court confrontation, but because of a jurisdictional problem with Rumsfeld 
being named the respondent of Padilla’s petition rather than Commander Melanie Marr 
of the naval brig, the court wasn’t able to address the overarching constitutional 
question. 
 Nevertheless, in the cases of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Rasul v. Bush, the justices 
did respond directly to the issues presented.  The Hamdi case centered on whether Mr. 
Hamdi, an American citizen captured on a battlefield in Afghanistan and deemed an 
enemy combatant, had the right to a “meaningful” inquiry into the factual basis for his 
detention.  His father had submitted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on his behalf, 
contending that the government was violating his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights by holding him without a trial.  In a 6-3 decision, the court held Hamdi’s 
citizenship and the fact that he was being held on American territory (the naval brig in 
Charleston, South Carolina) gave him the right to a “meaningful opportunity to contest 
the factual basis” for his detention.
132
  Again, as in Justice Murphy’s concurring opinion 
in Hirabayashi v. U.S. and his dissenting opinion in Korematsu v. U.S., the idea that in 
wartime the other branches of government can operate unchecked was refuted.  In this 
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instance, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor declared, “A state of war is not a blank check for 
the president when it comes to the rights of the nation’s citizens,” and particularly in 
challenging times “we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for 
which we fight abroad.”  New York Times reporter Anthony Lewis added: “The justices 
did what they have often shied away from doing: said no to the argument that the title 
commander-in-chief means that the president can do whatever he says is necessary to 
win a war.”
133
 
 The court also decided 6-3 in favor of the petitioners in Rasul v. Bush, which 
involved a total of 14 petitioners, all captured in hostilities abroad, and all held at 
Guantanamo Bay.  The petitioners uniformly claimed to have never engaged in 
hostilities against the U.S. and to have never been terrorists.  This claim was coupled 
with the fact that they had never been allowed to consult with legal counsel nor provided 
access to courts or tribunals.  To their habeas requests, the court gave an unprecedented 
ruling that the Guantanamo Bay naval base does not lie beyond U.S. district courts’ 
jurisdictions by virtue of the fact that the U.S. operates complete jurisdiction over the 
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region, regardless of Cuba’s “ultimate sovereignty.”
134
  This confirmed the U.S. Justice 
Department’s fears from their December 2001 memo, as detainees held at Gitmo were 
consequently allowed to challenge their detentions in U.S. courts.  
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CONCLUSION 
This essay has illustrated significant ties existing between two separate historical 
periods.  Both Presidents Roosevelt and Bush used detainment in their attempts to 
prevent future attacks, and the significant linkage was that both approved programs in 
which detainees were held uncharged and without adequate access to trials.  There are 
other similarities, of which there is no better example than the attacks that ushered the 
U.S. into each turbulent era.  On December 7, 1941, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor 
in complete surprise killing 2,338 people which, until the September 11 attacks, 
represented the largest loss of life in one single enemy attack against U.S. territory in 
history.  Consequently, the 9/11 hijackers killed a total of 3,047 people when they 
crashed four commercial jetliners in the eastern U.S. in 2001.  In both cases, the initial 
government response was aggressive FBI arrests and interrogations.  Also, the shared 
public sentiment towards supporting the limitation of civil liberties for Japanese 
Americans in the 1940s and for Muslim and Arab Americans between 2001 and 2004 
proved that any critique of the government’s actions would be incomplete without also 
discussing the feelings of the general public.             
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Concerning these two historical episodes, there are clearly important differences, 
but it was the aim of this thesis to investigate the possibility that in spite of these 
distinctions, President Roosevelt’s internment of Japanese Americans might have served 
as an historical precedent to President Bush’s detainment of terrorist suspects.  One of 
these vital distinctions was that Bush’s Military Order specifically targeted non-U.S. 
citizens, who were for the most part combat prisoners, not citizens of minority descent.  
Nevertheless, the “legal black hole” in which Guantanamo Bay detainees found 
themselves was disturbingly similar to that encountered by Japanese American internees 
60 years earlier.  Specifically, claims to habeas corpus rights united these two historical 
episodes by virtue of the fact that in each case the government pressed its rights to 
protect the nation even if it meant using means that ignored constitutional and 
international civil liberties protections.   
The connection is summed up in Fred Korematsu’s brief of amicus curiae, 
written in 2003, which supported the petitioners Khaled A. F. Al Odah, Shafiq Rasul, 
and Yasir Esam Hamdi, in their claims against the government.  Through the recounting 
of six examples in U.S. history when civil liberties were at their most constrained, 
Korematsu championed the idea that “only by understanding the errors of the past can 
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we do better in the present.”  His argument began, “history teaches that, in time of war, 
we have often sacrificed fundamental freedoms unnecessarily,” and “courts, which are 
not immune to the demands of public opinion, have too often deferred to exaggerated 
claims of military necessity and failed to insist that measures curtailing constitutional 
rights be carefully justified and narrowly tailored.”  Additionally, he recalled his own 
experiences during WWII when more than 120,000 Japanese Americans were interned, 
and he stressed that “no charges were brought against these individuals; there were no 
hearings; they did not know where they were going, how long they would be detained, 
what conditions they would face, or what fate would await them.”  Then, to make the 
connection, Korematsu urged that, “To avoid a repetition of past mistakes, this court 
should closely scrutinize the government’s claims of “military necessity” in these cases 
to ensure that civil liberties are not unnecessarily restricted.”
135
  Surely, Mr. Korematsu 
was pleased by the court’s 2004 decisions in both the Hamdi and Rasul cases. 
Perhaps the most important relationship to look for has not yet had the 
opportunity to fully develop.  The peaceful resettlement and successful assimilation of 
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the Japanese American population following their incarceration was no small feat and 
involved thousands of human beings demonstrating tremendous self-discipline in 
swallowing, what must have been, unbelievable feelings of bitterness and betrayal.  To 
be sure, the words of President Truman, upon presenting a citation to a Nisei regiment 
on July 15, 1946, were true when he told them: “You fought not only the enemy, but you 
fought prejudice—and you have won.  Keep up that fight, and we will continue to win—
to make this great Republic stand for just what the Constitution says it stands for: the 
welfare of all the people all the time.”
136
  Therefore, the question now becomes: How 
will the more than 10,000 terrorism suspects detained or interrogated worldwide affect 
society as a whole?  Will they reintegrate peacefully and try to forget the injustices the 
way the Japanese Americans did, or will violence and terror be spawned from their hate-
inspiring detentions?  Along with the more than 200 Guantanamo Bay detainees who 
have already been released apparently after the U.S. government reached the conclusion 
that they no longer or never did pose a threat to U.S. interests, Michael Ratner cited U.S. 
intelligence reports that suggested “at least 59 individuals from Afghanistan and 
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Pakistan were captured and shipped off to Guantánamo despite not fitting the screening 
criteria for such a transfer.”  Because of this, a military official who served as an 
interrogator observed, “If they weren’t terrorists before, they certainly could be now.”
137
  
Former Gitmo interrogation translator Erik Saar also noticed signs that indicated a 
smooth transition after the War on Terror might be extremely difficult.  With regards to 
Islamic Fundamentalism, he recalled, “many detainees had arrived as fervent believers; 
most of the rest had turned in that direction with their imprisonment.”  Saar noted that 
those detainees released from Gitmo “were given no apologies upon their release and no 
money to compensate them for the loss of a year of their lives or to help get them on 
their way again.”
138
  Therefore, whether issues of distrust or even outright hatred, it 
seems clear that the U.S. has failed, at least in the short run, to win the War on Terror 
and also to win the battle of public sentiment that will surely help decide how long this 
war will endure.   
One thing is for sure, the longer President Bush maintains his current detainment 
policy, the better chance his legacy will mirror and possibly even overshadow that of 
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President Roosevelt for internment programs that violated constitutional civil liberties 
protections.  The issue then, no matter how idealistic it may sound, is that the sworn duty 
of the President has always been to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution,” not 
the shores of California or the buildings of New York City.  Thus, until policies are 
prioritized according to this historic oath, rights violations will likely continue.    
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